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SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON
RUSSIAN-PROPOSED SS-25 RVOSI PROCEDURES AND NEW VEHICLES AT
SS-25 BASES, NOVEMBER 3, 2005

REF: GENEVA 2690 (JCIC-XXVII-035)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

- [1](#). (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-041.
- [2](#). (U) Meeting Date: November 3, 2005
Time: 11:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[3](#). (U) A Working Group meeting was held at the Russian Mission on November 3, 2005, to discuss the Russian-proposed SS-25 road-mobile ICBM RV on-site inspection (RVOSI) demonstration, and the new vehicles which the Russian Federation informally announced will soon be at SS-25 road-mobile ICBM bases. All Parties except Kazakhstan were represented.

[4](#). (S) On the Russian-proposed RVOSI demonstration, the U.S. Delegation stressed the need for relevance between the demonstration and future inspections. The Russian Delegation said that, during the demonstration, measurements would be made of the outer diameter of two rings, and the inner diameter of the aft ring. The inner diameter of the forward ring will be covered. U.S. inspectors would be permitted to make these same measurements during follow-on RVOSIs. Moreover, it would be clear where the aft ring was attached to the front section. The U.S. Delegation also asked a series of questions related to the logistics of the demonstration as well as questions on the status of participants. The Russian Delegation suggested the team composition should be similar to an inspection team. The Russian Delegation clarified that they would select the base for the demonstration, but the U.S. team would select the restricted area as well as the launcher.

[5](#). (S) With respect to the new vehicles at SS-25 bases, the U.S. Delegation asked how the United States would distinguish these vehicles from launchers during cooperative measures. The Russian Delegation acknowledged that answers to questions related to the number of vehicles and where they would be located were still unknown and, if problems arose, the issue could be discussed in the JCIC. These vehicles were .78 meters shorter than SS-25 launchers, had the jack points cut off and there was no missile launch canister. They would begin appearing in the Spring of 2006.

SS-25 RVOSI DEMONSTRATION
MODELED AFTER TRIDENT
DEMONSTRATION

[6](#). (S) At a working group meeting at the Russian Mission on November 3, 2005, Buttrick began the meeting by stating that it was obvious that a great deal of work had been done in Moscow and at the road-mobile ICBM bases. He explained that the U.S. Delegation needed to ask some clarifying questions concerning the presentation made by the Russian Delegation at a previous meeting (REFTEL). Buttrick noted Russia's explanation that the demonstration was modeled after the Trident RVOSI demonstration and stated that demonstrations appeared to go a long way towards helping to resolve issues and hopefully will. Buttrick emphasized that the Trident RVOSI demonstration proved the relevance between the demonstration and what would be seen by inspectors in the course of future RV inspections.

WHAT MEASUREMENTS
WILL BE PERMITTED?

17. (S) Buttrick asked whether U.S. inspectors on SS-25 RVOSIs would be permitted to make the same measurements of the diameters of the RV cover's forward and aft attachment rings that were made during the demonstration to confirm that the rings are the same size as those that would be used in the demonstration. He also asked Fedorchenko to explain exactly which measurements would be made during the demonstration. Fedorchenko explained that, after observers viewed the front section with the standard RVOSI cover, Russian escorts would remove the forward and aft rings from the front section and place them on the ground one on top of the other. He stated that it would be obvious that the rings have the same outer diameter. Then measurements, as described in the Russian briefing, would be made. Measurements would be made of the outer diameters of the attachment rings. Observers would also ascertain visually that the spokes of the forward attachment ring connecting the aft ring to the forward ring are longer than the spokes of the aft attachment ring connecting the aft ring to the forward ring. Measurements would be taken of the inner diameter of the aft ring; however, the inner diameter of the forward ring would be covered. Buttrick asked whether the length of the spokes would be provided. Fedorchenko responded that the length of the spokes could be determined by subtracting the inner diameter from the outer diameter. Buttrick asked whether measurements would be made in the second phase of the demonstration of the sock-like cover on the front section, as was done during the first phase with the large, barrel-shaped RVOSI cover. Fedorchenko replied that the procedure in the briefing is an additional procedure. The current procedure calls for measurement of the assembled soft cover. The length that will be measured is 3.2 meters.

DOES THE DEMONSTRATION
TRANSLATE INTO IMPROVED
INSPECTOR CONFIDENCE?

18. (S) Buttrick stated that what was needed for an effective demonstration was to provide the observers with facts from the demonstration that could be used by inspectors during subsequent RVOSIs to ensure that there were no more than the attributed number of RVs on the SS-25 ICBMs. For example, during the Trident RVOSI demonstration, the U.S. demonstrated that the Trident RVOSI hardcover was placed on the missile the same way during each RVOSI. This was the same cover that inspectors see at each RVOSI. Russian inspectors were allowed to measure any dimension of the hardcover. During the Trident demonstration, the RVOSI hardcover was lowered onto the missile and showed observers that there was a consistent distance between the top of the cover's spoke and the top of the third-stage rocket motor. Buttrick followed this description by asking Fedorchenko how Russia will prove that the SS-25 RV cover would be placed on the missile in the same configuration during every subsequent RVOSI, and whether escorts would be able to provide proof that the cover was being presented for inspection the same way each time. Fedorchenko differentiated SS-25 RVOSIs from Trident RVOSIs, in that Russia had allowed RV soft cover measurements which were not required by the Treaty. He stated that U.S. inspectors will be permitted to measure the aft ring's inner diameter and this would provide inspectors with the assurance that this is the same sized ring and that it is mounted in the same manner as in the demonstration. He further stated that all RVs have the same conical shape and that, when the cover goes on an RV, it fits in the same place as in the demonstration. He again invited the United States to the demonstration. Singer asked Fedorchenko whether inspectors will also be able to measure the inner diameter of the aft ring during an RVOSI. Fedorchenko assured the U.S. Delegation that all measurements done during the demonstration will be available during an SS-25 RVOSI. Singer asked whether inspectors would be given the opportunity to measure the distance between the aft and forward attachment rings while the cover was on the missile. Fedorchenko replied that they did not envision that.

COMPOSITION OF THE
OBSERVATION TEAM

19. (S) Smith began a series of questions about the specifics of the observation team. He asked what the diplomatic status of the U.S. observation team would be while in Russia. Smith recalled that, during the demonstration of Russia's new radiation detection equipment (RDE) in Moscow, the U.S. observation team was comprised of various individuals who were not on the Treaty's inspector list. Fedorchenko responded by asking whether the United States wanted to include people who were not on the inspector list. Smith

explained that the United States would like to have the flexibility to build the team based on personnel availability. Fedorchenko responded that these were two different kinds of demonstrations. The RDE demonstration was in Moscow, not at a Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) base. Smith continued by asking why Russia was limiting the number of observers to ten individuals, stating that the United States envisioned a mix of expertise on the observation team, such as linguists, individuals with inspection experience, as well as members of the JCIC Delegation. Fedorchenko replied by asking how many individuals the United States wanted to have on the team. Smith explained that it would be more useful to have about 15 observers. Fedorchenko responded that space limitations in the demonstration building would be the same, and that the figure of ten observers, to include linguists, was from the Treaty. To gain further clarification on the planned status of observers, Smith asked whether the observers would be afforded the same privileges as inspectors, such as diplomatic status and emergency medical care. Fedorchenko responded that this is why Russia would prefer observers to be on the inspector list and have START visas. He stated that he wanted to make the demonstration as close as possible to the inspection regime. The only difference was the proposal for the United States to provide notification of the observation team's arrival with a NRRC Notification Format 144 instead of a Format 116 as is the requirement for notification of inspection team arrivals. He explained that using the Format 144 would not reduce the United State's inspection quota. He stated that for the Russian bases the demonstration would be like an inspection, and for Russia's financial accounting the demonstration would also be treated like an inspection. He asserted that that only the Russian military leadership was aware of the demonstration, not the SRF. Buttrick asked whether other Parties would be present during the demonstration. Fedorchenko responded that he did not find it necessary, stating the other Parties did not enjoy the right to inspections at Russian bases.

WHEN AND WHERE?

110. (S) Buttrick stated that he understood from the briefing that the selection of the demonstration's base would be based on the time of year; however, for U.S. planning purposes, he wanted to know whether the Russian Federation had an approximate date for the demonstration to take place. Fedorchenko responded by reminding the delegation that the Trident RVOSI demonstration was proposed in 2000 and was only conducted this year. However, he said that Russia was ready to conduct the demonstration in the near future. He stated that he needed first to view the demonstration himself and report the results to his leadership who would make the decision. He stated that his leaders were skeptical so there was no date set and it would depend on how soon the United States accepts the demonstration proposal. Fedorchenko stated that the point of entry (POE) would be Moscow to facilitate the processing of the demonstration observers; adding the base selection would depend on the SRF.

HOW LONG?

111. (S) Buttrick stated he understood that the duration of the visit in Russia would depend on the base and the travel time to the base, however, how long would the demonstration last? Fedorchenko reiterated that the demonstration had two phases. He said that RVOSIs at road-mobile bases go quickly, but there will be an additional phase for the demonstration and it would require preparation. He stated that he was not sure how long the preparation would take, but possibly 10-16 additional hours for base personnel. He said that the team would probably be at the base for two days. Buttrick verified with Fedorchenko that the United States would select the restricted area from within the base chosen by the Russian Federation.

THE PROCESS

112. (S) Fortier asked whether observers would have continuous observation of the launcher during preparation for phase two of the demonstration as is done during a RVOSI. He noted that inspectors during RVOSIs were normally located at the rear of the launcher. Fedorchenko stated that all operations will be conducted under observation of the U.S. team. Fortier asked Fedorchenko to clarify whether the observation is for the duration of the demonstration. Fedorchenko responded that they would conduct all actions as in a normal inspection. Responding to this statement, Fortier asked whether the sock-like device to be used during the second phase would be available for inspection also. Fedorchenko replied that it would be in the room, but there

was no need to examine it.

KARUSEL RDE REVISITED

113. (S) Rumohr remarked that the Russian Federation removed their "poke" proposal from the table, but kept open the Karusel RDE as a proposal. He asked whether the Russians saw the RDE as being a confidence-building proposal to augment the new RVOSI proposal. The United States was not clear what the value added would be from RDE. Fedorchenko responded that many in the Russian Federation believe it is the best method and should be used. He added that it detects the number of RVs remotely, is highly precise, and simplifies RVOSIs. He stated that he believed it has a bright future. Buttrick thanked him for the explanation, saying it was important that the U.S. Delegation understood the new RVOSI proposal clearly in order to accurately characterize it to Washington.

UKRAINE'S VIEWS

114. (S) Shevtsov stated that he believed the demonstration would be very useful and worth accepting without prejudice, as was the case with the Trident Demonstration. He said that having two or three additional observers on the team was not a problem. As for the other Parties' participation, he said they needed to discuss this because a JCIC document may be produced as a result of the demonstration. Finally, Shevtsov asserted that the Karusel RDE is a universal approach for counting RVs.

THE NEXT STEP

115. (S) Following up on Shevtsov's question, during the break between issue discussions, Kottmyer asked Fedorchenko whether the Russian Federation thought that the proposal should be recorded in some fashion, if the Parties ultimately decided that it would resolve the issue. Fedorchenko replied that the Parties could consider recording it in a coordinated plenary statement, as in the case of the Trident RVOSI issue.

NEW VEHICLES AT SS-25
ROAD-MOBILE ICBM BASES

116. (S) Buttrick began discussions regarding the information Russia presented at the November 1, 2005 Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting on new vehicles that will appear at SS-25 road-mobile ICBM bases (REFTEL). Buttrick said that the United States appreciated the goodwill statement Russia provided on this issue, and acknowledged the U.S. understanding that the new vehicles Russia referred to would be former SS-25 ICBM road-mobile launchers that had been eliminated in accordance with the Treaty and were no longer accountable. (Begin comment: Per REFTEL, these vehicles will be used by Russia to ensure the safety and security of roads to be transited by SS-25 road-mobile ICBM launchers. End comment.)

117. (S) Buttrick asked how many vehicles Russia planned to have at each SS-25 road-mobile ICBM base, how many total vehicles Russia planned to use, and where Russia planned to locate these vehicles within the restricted areas of road-mobile ICBM bases. Fedorchenko replied that he did not know the specific plans for the provision of these vehicles to Russian bases. He stated that the vehicles exist already at the Conversion or Elimination Facility at Piban'shur and would be sent to SS-25 road-mobile ICBM bases in early 2006. However, he stated that the Russian Delegation did not know at this time exactly where they would be sent and which restricted areas they would be located in. Buttrick responded that it would be helpful if Russia provided that information in the future.

118. (S) Buttrick questioned why the Russian Delegation stated, in its November 1, 2005 presentation of this issue, that it would be difficult to identify these vehicles using national technical means (NTM). Buttrick further asked how the United States would distinguish these vehicles from SS-25 road-mobile launchers, particularly during cooperative measures when launchers were removed from their fixed structures.

119. (S) Fedorchenko responded that the issue would be discussed in the JCIC if there proved to be a problem. Regarding potential difficulties arising from the NTM ability to distinguish these vehicles, Fedorchenko commented that he was not aware of U.S. NTM capability, so the previous comment about it potentially being a problem was a guess. He stated that if, during the course of an inspection, U.S. inspectors found such a vehicle they could take photographs to help

address potential problems. He noted that the vehicles had certain features that distinguished them from SS-25 road-mobile launchers:

- The vehicles are 78 centimeters shorter;
- The jack points have been cut off;
- There is no missile canister; and
- There are concrete blocks instead of a launcher mechanism.

Fedorchenko noted that he did not know the shape of the concrete blocks, and suggested the blocks might be loaded at the ICBM bases.

¶20. (S) Buttrick asked for clarification as to when Russia would begin using these vehicles, to which Fedorchenko replied "Spring of 2006." Buttrick asked whether the vehicles would be based on Version A launchers, Version B launchers, or both. Fedorchenko replied that he did not know and it would not make a difference; Russia probably would use whichever vehicles worked, and since the launchers were considered eliminated anyway, it did not matter. Buttrick thanked the Russian Delegation again for the information and stated he would convey the information to Washington for review.

¶21. (U) Documents exchanged. None.

¶22. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hay
Mr. Johnston
Ms. Kottmyer
Mr. Kuehne
Maj Mitchner
Col Rumohr
Mr. Singer
Mr. Smith
Mr. Vogel
Mr. Hopkins (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Russia

Col Fedorchenko
Col Yegorov
Col Kamenskiy
Mr. Kashirin
Col Razumov
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Mezhenyy
Lt Col Novikov
Col Osetrov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Stefanovich
Mr. Shabalin
Mr. Venevtsov
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Gusev (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov
Col Taran

¶23. (U) Taylor sends.
Moley